According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the first three months of this year, 24,376 Chinese nationals were apprehended crossing the U.S. Southern Border, while about 1,000 have been crossing the northern border monthly. Under the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), all Chinese citizens and entities are required to assist the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in intelligence gathering. The threat from China is real, pervasive, and growing, as Beijing exploits America’s open borders and freedoms to plant spies within the U.S. government, military, research labs, and institutions.
In September 2024, Linda Sun, a former aide to New York Governors Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul, was arrested for acting as an undisclosed agent for the Chinese government. She is accused of leveraging her position to further Chinese interests by influencing state policies and facilitating meetings between Chinese and U.S. officials. Sun’s case reflects a broader strategy by China to infiltrate U.S. political systems by targeting state and local officials. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) often exploits naturalized U.S. citizens with ties to China, using business opportunities and family connections to gain influence. Sun’s arrest underscores China’s efforts to influence rising political figures and manipulate policies, including those concerning Taiwan, through covert operations.
The Annual Threat Assessment from the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies China as the top espionage threat to the United States. The FBI’s China Threat Report highlights that counterintelligence and economic espionage activities by the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pose a significant danger to U.S. economic security and democratic values. China’s goals include influencing U.S. policy to benefit its interests while striving for global dominance through tactics such as intellectual property theft, cyber intrusions, and predatory business practices. These efforts span various sectors, including business, academia, and government, necessitating a coordinated response from both the U.S. government and private industry to effectively address the threat.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported in its Survey of Chinese Espionage that there have been 224 documented cases of Chinese espionage targeting the United States since 2000. These efforts primarily involve the covert acquisition of sensitive information by Chinese intelligence officers or agents, illustrating the increasing trend of Chinese influence operations in the U.S. However, the survey does not cover espionage activities against U.S. entities in China, attempts to smuggle controlled technologies, or over 1,200 intellectual property theft lawsuits brought by U.S. companies. This suggests that the actual scope of the China threat is much larger when considering all forms of espionage.
China’s espionage efforts, driven by the aggressive policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), heavily rely on cyberattacks, with 104 instances of cyber espionage reported in the past decade. These efforts primarily target military and commercial technologies. In addition to cyber espionage, traditional methods like agent recruitment through bribery or coercion and unconventional tactics, such as purchasing property near sensitive U.S. facilities, are also employed. According to a CSIS report, 49% of espionage cases involved Chinese military or government personnel, 41% involved private Chinese citizens, and 10% involved non-Chinese individuals recruited by Chinese officials. The report also notes that 46% of these cases were cyber-related, 29% targeted military technology, 54% sought commercial technologies, and 17% focused on U.S. civilian agencies or politicians.
Chinese espionage in the United States is a complex and growing threat, targeting both public and private sectors, especially within sensitive military domains. A recent example is the case of Jinchao “Patrick” Wei, a U.S. Navy machinist stationed on the USS Essex, who was convicted of passing classified military documents to a Chinese intelligence officer. Wei exploited his position to share sensitive information, thereby aiding China’s military strategy.
In another recent espionage case, Yuanjun Tang, a U.S. citizen who was granted asylum, was accused of spying on Chinese pro-democracy activists by helping Chinese authorities infiltrate an encrypted group chat used by dissidents. Similarly, Shujun Wang, a Chinese-American scholar and pro-democracy activist, was convicted of leveraging his position to gather and pass information about dissidents to the Chinese government. Additionally, in 2022, Chinese nationals Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping were arrested for running an illegal police station in New York’s Chinatown, where they monitored and intimidated critics of the Chinese government. The FBI raided the station shutting it down. These cases exemplify China’s far-reaching efforts to target dissidents and influence operations within the U.S.
Chinese espionage has also deeply infiltrated the technology sector. In March 2024, the arrest of Linwei “Leon” Ding revealed how Chinese agents exploit positions within major tech companies to steal valuable trade secrets. Ding’s access to proprietary AI technology at Google, which he transmitted to Chinese entities, highlights China’s strategic goal of achieving technological dominance. Similarly, Chenguang Gong, a former engineer, was arrested for allegedly stealing missile-tracking technology for China. These cases underscore China’s efforts to obtain advanced technologies to bolster its military and economic power. Both the U.S. Department of Defense and the FBI have frequently warned that such espionage activities threaten U.S. global competitiveness and security, with the technology and defense sectors being prime targets.
The cases mentioned demonstrate the broad scope of China’s espionage activities in the U.S., spanning military, technology, politics, and academia. These operations not only jeopardize U.S. national security but also threaten the nation’s economic leadership and technological innovation. U.S. intelligence agencies consistently stress the need for strong counterintelligence efforts to combat this escalating threat.
Further compounding the issue, the House Committee on Homeland Security reported an 8,000% increase in the apprehensions of Chinese nationals illegally entering the U.S. via the southern border, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data. This surge raises additional concerns about potential espionage risks as part of China’s broader infiltration strategy.
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